in No. as Amici Curiae in No. In Brown, this Court held that the governments segregation of schoolchildren by race violates the Constitutions promise of equal protection. This Court has made many decisions of widespread effect; none would affect more people more directly in more fundamental interests and, in fact, cause more chaos in local government than a reversal of the decision in this case). This Court upheld the plan, see McDaniel, 402 U. S., at 41, rejecting the parents argument that a person may not be included or excluded solely because he is a Negro or because he is white. Brief for Respondents in McDaniel, O. T. 1970, No. The basic problem with the pluralitys technical dicta-based response lies in its overly theoretical approach to case law, an approach that emphasizes rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta in a way that serves to mask the radical nature of todays decision. It is an interest in continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by these school-related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. The subsequent statements by the unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Four of Seattles high schools are located in the northBallard, Nathan Hale, Ingraham, and Rooseveltand five in the southRainier Beach, Cleveland, West Seattle, Chief Sealth, and Franklin. in No. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. See, e.g., D. Armor, Forced Justice (1995). 693, 227 N.E. 2d 729 (1967), appeal dismd, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam), post, at 35, is inapposite for the same reason that many of the cases cited by Justice Breyer are inapposite; the case involved a Massachusetts law that required school districts to avoid racial imbalance in schools but did not specify how to achieve this goaland certainly did not require express racial classifications as the means to do so. . Seattle School District No. Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. Presidential administrations for the past half-century have used and supported various race-conscious measures. Remediation of past de jure segregation is a one-time process involving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified entity. The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual racial classifications. tion of the races); id., at App. [Footnote 18]. . appeals for the ninth circuit, CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 128129, 492 P.2d 536, 541542 (1972) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984) (en banc); School Comm. See 426 F.3d 1162, 11691171 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). In respect to high schools, for example, a student was given a list of a subset of schools, carefully selected by the board to balance racial distribution in the district by including neighborhood schools and schools in racially different neighborhoods elsewhere in the city. See Grutter, supra, at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing consideration of race only if it does not become a predominant factor). Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. The fact that Seattle has ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome here is not dispositive, since the district vigorously defends its programs constitutionality, and nowhere suggests that it will not resume using race to assign students if it prevails. Two of the plaintiffs in this case had children who were entering high school in the fall of 2000. Brief for Petitioner at 79. The racial makeup of the school population amounted to 43% white, 24% black, and 23% Asian or Pacific Islander, with Hispanics and Native Americans making up the rest. The District also contends that the racial tiebreaker was necessary because other race-neutral activities were inadequate to achieve their compelling interests. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. This will surely, however, restrict school districts efforts to achieve diversity and the benefits that arguably come with it. First, the race-conscious criteria at issue only help set the outer bounds of broad ranges. The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High Schools special Biotechnology Career Academy. 05908, at 7. See 448 U. S., at 539. Considering the precedent of Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), which is only partly applicable because it concerns higher education, it is apparent that educational institutions must use diversity as one of several admissions criteria rather than setting strict quotas. Even in the context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n. 14 ([A desegregation] order contemplating the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing is infirm as a matter of law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. at 116669. That is what is at issue here. See, e.g., App. The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of educational policy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Whats your understanding of when a school suffers from racial isolation? The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8 percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. The term racial imbalance refers to a ratio between nonwhite and other students in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which nonwhite children study, serve and work. The justification for race-conscious remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. in No. [Footnote 22] The dissent argues that todays decision threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, post, at 2, and claims that todays decision risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation, post, at 65. The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications are clear enough. The Supreme Court will now review that determination in light of its Equal Protection decisions in Grutter and Gratz and is asked to decide whether racial diversity in high schools is a compelling state interest. 90a92a. must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. Ante, at 31, n.16 (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227). 2d 753, 756, and nn. The histories I have set forth describe the extensive and ongoing efforts of two school districts to bring about greater racial integration of their public schools. Respondent school districts voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely on race to determine which schools certain children may attend. See Brief for Petitioner at 4647. Garfield was the only oversubscribed school whose composition during the 19992000 school year was within the racial guidelines, although in previous years Garfields enrollment had been predominantly nonwhite, and the racial tiebreaker had been used to give preference to white students. See ante, at 1213. at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and Assignments 20052006 School Year (Apr. Petitioner Crystal Meredith challenges the districts decision to deny her son Joshua McDonald a requested transfer for his kindergarten enrollment. 3 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. In this hearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed itself yet again, ruling that the Seattle school districts admission program was narrowly tailored and constitutionally acceptable. In a word, the school plans under review do not involve the kind of race-based harm that has led this Court, in other contexts, to find the use of race-conscious criteria unconstitutional. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969. See 539 U. S., at 326. Such deference is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. That is, it is not in all circumstances strict in theory, but fatal in fact. Id., at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). Similarly, the Federal courts which have considered the issue . In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007), the United States Supreme Courtfound that the school district was using race in an unconstitutional manner in its assignment plan. Parents Involved, the Court noted that: Seattle and Louisville had not demonstrated that they seriously considered race-neutral alternatives; the individual racial classifications used had a minimal impact that cast doubt on their necessity; the districts defined [Footnote 14] Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human beings race will never be achieved. Croson, supra, at 495 (plurality opinion of OConnor, J.) [Footnote 6] Id., at 28a35a. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. in No. 233234 (Summer 2001) (describing this effect in schools in Charlotte, North Carolina). 05908. Over a period of several months in 20072008, JCPS developed a diversity plan based upon social economic and minority status (income of parents), a plan suggested by school board members Steve Imhoff and Larry Hujo in 2002. there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. While this Court has permitted the States to legislate or otherwise officially act experimentally in the social and economic fields, it has always recognized and held that this power is subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and that the tests of the Constitution must be met); Reply Brief for Appellants in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. Finally, it lists several race-neutral alternatives that were considered (such as a lottery system, the use of poverty as a proxy for race, and regional assignments) and argues that they would not have been as effective as the plan that is the subject of this litigation. Consequently, school boards seeking to remedy those societal problems with race-based measures in schools today would have no way to gauge the proper scope of the remedy. For instance, students who attend Franklin and Ballard will receive metro passes rather than bus service. Extending Grutter to this context would require us to cut that holding loose from its theoretical moorings. See ibid. But what was constitutionally required of the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior segregationnot racial proportionality in its own right. See 539 U. S., at 320. Cf. No. At the elementary school level, based on his or her address, each student is designated a resides school to which students within a specific geographic area are assigned; elementary resides schools are grouped into clusters in order to facilitate integration. App. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. Such measures may include strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood demographics; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. The Court quoted the articulation of diversity from Justice Powells opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), noting that it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race. Grutter, supra, at 324325 (citing and quoting Bakke, supra, at 314315 (opinion of Powell, J. In "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Roberts cites Adarand, supra, at 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that [a]t the heart of the Constitutions guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 602 (OConnor, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted). Part IV (again joined only by a plurality of the Court) addressed Justice Breyer's dissent. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. Justice Breyers dissent also asserts that these cases are controlled by Grutter, claiming that the existence of a compelling interest in these cases follows a fortiori from Grutter, post, at 41, 6466, and accusing us of tacitly overruling that case, see post, at 6466. However, shortly after we dismissed the Massachusetts suit for want of a substantial federal question, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed course and upheld its statute in the published decision that Justice Breyer extensively quotes in his dissent. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. The Seattle district, which has never operated legally segregated schools or Read More(2007) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School . Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. See post, at 3745. See Brief for Respondent at 13. One of those plans, which involved using race as a factor in assigning students to high schools, is the subject of this litigation. Dayton Bd. We simply do not understand how Justice Breyer can maintain that classifying every schoolchild as black or white, and using that classification as a determinative factor in assigning children to achieve pure racial balance, can be regarded as less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored than the consideration of race in Grutter, post, at 47, when the Court in Grutter stated that [t]he importance of individualized consideration in the program was paramount, and consideration of race was one factor in a highly individualized, holistic review. 539 U. S., at 337. Is it not of all the activities of government the one which most nearly approaches the hearts and minds of people, the question of the education of their young? To equate the achievement of a certain statistical mix in several schools with the elimination of the system of systematic de jure segregation trivializes the latter accomplishment. Second, Seattle noted that it has ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome of this litigation. See Freeman, 503 U. S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring). The citations do not carry the significance the districts would ascribe to them. Grutter, supra, at 326. The Department of Education has characterized this as a compelling interest in regulations and various other statements. See App. Cf. http: //www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05 all.pdf. Wygant, 476 U. S., at 283. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools objected to Seattles most recent plan under the State and Federal Constitutions. It was then more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is today. Which of the following statements offers the most accurate comparison between this case and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)? Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 2829 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). 1, pp. In 2003, the Supreme Court decided two casesGrutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)both of which involved affirmative action in higher education admissions. But in Seattle the plans are defended as necessary to address the consequences of racially identifiable housing patterns. Instead of strict scrutiny, Judge Kozinski would have analyzed the plans under robust and realistic rational basis review. Id., at 1194. Disfavoring a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of racean approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.483 (1954). Wygant, 476 U. S., at 275276 (plurality opinion); id., at 295 (White, J., concurring in judgment). See also, e.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (CA2 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. By 1988, many white families had left the school district, and many Asian families had moved in. [Footnote 3]. But the Court set forth in Swann a basic principle of constitutional lawa principle of law that has found wide acceptance in the legal culture. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 330 (1999); id., at 331, 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing wide acceptance in the legal culture as adequate reason not to overrule prior cases). Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. First, in schools that were formerly segregated by law, race-based measures are sometimes constitutionally compelled to remedy prior school segregation. Another brief claims that school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the achievement of African-American students. App. . 1. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the court as to Parts I, II, III-A and III-C. Part I recounted the background of the plans of the two school boards. In the districts public schools approximately 41 percent of enrolled students are white; the remaining 59 percent, comprising all other racial groups, are classified by Seattle for assignment purposes as nonwhite. Justice Breyer would not only put such extraordinary weight on admitted dicta, but relies on the statement for something it does not remotely say. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. For the 2006-2007 school year, the school district has suspended the tiebreaker pending litigation. See McDaniel, supra, at 41. They asked the court to dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. Does the pluralitys view of the Equal Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to such a board determination? Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 740741, and n.19 (1974). By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II) (Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. http://reportcard. Due to a variety of factorssome influenced by government, some notneighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. The Seattle school districts Website formerly contained the following definition of cultural racism: Those aspects of society that overtly and covertly attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and devalue, stereotype, and label people of color as other, different, less than, or render them invisible. 420, p.25. ); brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). He admits that there is a cost in applying a state-mandated racial label, post, at 67, but he is confident that the cost is worth paying. This case is the last of a trilogy of cases against Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS), including McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools,[8] and their use of race in assigning students to schools. See, e.g., post, at 21, 4849, 66. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schoolsCleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). 05908, at19. Roberts concludes that racial balancing cannot be a compelling state interest. The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the orders targets. This decision departs from long-standing jurisprudence on school desegregation. Because this Court has authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. See supra, at 45. And when de facto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the remedial rules are different. And we have understood that the Constitution permits local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so. [B]enign carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generations conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 609610 (OConnor, J., dissenting). The pluralitys postulate that [t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race, ante, at 4041, is not sufficient to decide these cases. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal. 1? There, a Georgia school board voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan. At a minimum, the pluralitys views would threaten a surge of race-based litigation. The rights established are personal rights). It consequently held unconstitutional the use of race-based targets to govern admission to magnet schools. See, e.g., post, at 1920. In due course, the Washington Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected the challenge and found Seattles plan lawful.
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